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2Introduction
 The Ares I Launch Vehicle was part of the Constellation Program, 
initially intended to provide transportation to orbit for crew en route to 
the ISS and later to be part of the “launch and a half” solution for 
follow-on missions to the moon.
3Introduction
 The Constellation Program office was established at the Johnson Space Center in Houston
 The Orion Project Office was also established at JSC
 The Ares I Launch Vehicle Project was established within the Launch Vehicles Projects 
Office at the Marshall Space Flight Center---3 primary elements managed out of Element 
Offices at the center
Constellation Organization
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6Presentation Structure
 This presentation is structured to identify a lesson 
encountered in the course of the Upper Stage 
Element design and development effort
 First chart will identify the lesson and some 
observations from the project
 Second chart identifies a recommendation to address 
the lesson
 Note that some of the lessons identified are not 
unique to an in-house project such as the US and 
may have been encountered by contractor 
organizations as well
7Lesson-Importance of Systems 
Engineering/Integration
 Level 3 (Ares I, Orion) and Level 4 (Elements, 
including Upper Stage) efforts were initiated 
before Level 2 (Constellation Program) was 
fully up and running
 Resulted in contracts and in-house effort that was not 
fully compliant with eventual Level 2 programmatic 
requirements
 Required additional effort to demonstrate compliance 
or equivalence when Level 2 requirements ultimately 
approved
 Early start of lower level projects was schedule driven
 Elements/Orion had to move out if schedule was to be 
met
8Lesson-Importance of Systems Engineering
 Schedule of milestone reviews did not allow complete 
flowdown of requirements (at SRR) or integration of analyses 
(PDR)
 Resulted in significant rework and delta reviews 
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9Lesson-Importance of Systems Engineering
 Recommendation(s)
 Assure that high level requirements are identified to 
the maximum extent possible to assure appropriate 
flow down to lower level elements/projects
 Assure milestone schedule allows for integration at 
the next higher level 
 If schedule is not available, assure lower level 
analyses are provided “for information” to allow 
early integration efforts
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Lesson-Importance of Early S&MA Involvement
 S&MA involvement at the earliest stages of the project allows 
early identification of potential safety issues (starting at 
concept phase)
 S&MA was involved in the Constellation Program from the beginning of 
the Exploration Systems Architecture Study through program 
cancellation
 In addition to safety issues, comparative assessment of 
reliability can be performed
 Note: the tendency to focus on absolute numbers in early reliability 
assessments must be avoided.  Early numbers have wide uncertainty 
and are often based on similarity analyses.  The significance is found in 
relative reliability of design options
 Trade studies must adequately weigh safety and reliability 
along with other figures of merit
 Early involvement allows S&MA to identify risks and support 
development of mitigation if performance issues drive selection 
of “less safe” options
 Allows appropriate planning for risk reduction
11
Lesson-Importance of Early S&MA Involvement
 Recommendation(s)
 Assure the Safety and Mission Assurance is involved 
at the earliest phase of project life cycle
 Safety and Reliability issues need to be identified 
early and resolutions coordinated
 Early involvement helps to minimize issues at later 
phases of the project where “fixes” are likely to be 
more expensive both in cost and schedule
 Assure Safety and Reliability assessments are 
included, and properly weighted, in figures of merit 
supporting trade studies and design decisions
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Lesson-Importance of Appropriate Staffing 
Levels
 This is a difficult issue to address with fixed funding creating a 
zero sum game
 What one organization “wins”, another must “lose”
 S&MA support is not independently funded
 S&MA workforce and other funding must be negotiated with the project or 
element management team
 As the responsible in-line engineering organization for S&MA 
deliverables, failure to obtain appropriate funding for in-house 
effort results in incomplete, late or inadequate analyses
 This is a different issue than reducing insight into development of the 
products by a prime contractor
 Insufficient funding means the work does not get done within planned 
schedule
 Intent is to be proactive in implementing S&MA requirements in 
the design.
 Inconsistent approach to managing S&MA resources at 
multiple centers created funding issues
 GRC S&MA funding approach changed during project execution
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Lesson-Importance of Appropriate Staffing 
Levels
 Recommendation(s)
 S&MA must be adequately funded to proactively 
support design and development
 Note:  Documentation of the S&MA analyses is 
less important than application of the 
tools/analyses to impact the design of the system
 Lead Project S&MA organization must account 
for and manage resource requirements to support 
the project across all involved centers
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Lesson-Importance S&MA Team Deployment
 The US Element was organized into numerous Integrated 
Product Teams (IPT)
 IPTs included design responsibility for US Systems (e.g. Main 
Propulsion System, Thrust Vector Control, Small Solids), Manufacturing 
and Assembly, Test, Logistics
 Ideally, most design IPTs would have dedicated Safety, Reliability & 
Maintainability and Quality Engineers assigned 
 Software design and development IPTs would have assigned SW Assurance 
personnel in Safety, Quality and Reliability (if required)
 M&A and Test IPTs are supported by Quality Engineering/Assurance 
and Industrial Safety
 Logistics IPT was supported by Reliability and Maintainability 
 This deployment allows for immediate input from the S&MA community 
on trade studies and design decisions
 The US S&MA team was assigned such that these disciplines 
were available to each of the subsystem IPTs
 Insufficient personnel were funded to assign dedicated support
 S&MA Involvement in the design process made a positive 
impact on by identifying potential issues early 
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Lesson-Importance S&MA Team Deployment
 Recommendation(s)
 Assure deployment of S&MA workforce to allow real time support to 
integrated product teams
 Assure assignment of Safety, R&M, Quality Engineering to 
subsystem design IPTs
 For Software development IPT, assure assignment of Software 
Quality, Software Safety and, if required, Software Reliability
 Assure assignment of Quality Engineering/Assurance and Industrial 
Safety Support to Manufacturing & Assembly and Test IPTs
 Some System Safety support for analysis of test articles in 
support of Test
 Potential for R&M Support to M&A for Process Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis and Design of Experiments (less frequent)
16
Lesson-Understanding of S&MA In-Line 
Engineering versus Assurance 
 The implementation of S&MA support to Upper Stage for an in-
house design and development effort placed the S&MA team in 
a position of in-line engineering
 This would have been the case until late in the development 
cycle when sustaining engineering was to be transferred to 
Boeing
 NASA/Support Contractor team performed in direct support of 
the design effort rather than in an oversight/insight role
 Raises the question…if the NASA S&MA team is doing an in-line 
engineering function, who is performing the assurance function?
 Independent S&MA personnel not supporting the project
 “Gray beard” organizations
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Lesson-Understanding of S&MA In-Line 
Engineering versus Assurance 
 Recommendation(s)
 Both in-line and assurance functions are required 
elements of the S&MA effort for in-house projects
 Resource planning must include performing both 
functions
18
Lesson-Importance of Close Coordination between 
Supportability and Reliability/Maintainability
 Reliability and Maintainability engineering are closely tied to 
Logistics (Supportability)
 These specialty engineering functions are often placed in the same 
organization
 MSFC places R&M in the S&MA organization and Logistics 
(Supportability) in the Engineering organization
 This does not create insurmountable issues but does make appropriate 
communication, coordination and data exchange very important
 Need to avoid “trap” of considering Logistics and Operations 
to be one and the same
 Operations are only a portion of Logistics
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Lesson-Importance of Close Coordination between 
Supportability and Reliability/Maintainability
 Recommendation(s)
 Assure appropriate coordination between R&M and 
Supportability
 Identify data exchange needs as early as possible in 
the project
 Assure that R&M is appropriately represented on the 
Logistics IPT and Logistics Control Boards
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Lesson-Importance of Engineering Data Systems
 Numerous engineering data systems were created to use as 
data repositories and data exchange sites
 Windchill
 DDMS
 Benefits
 Secure data transfer for Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 
information
 Note:  Be aware of “overclassification”
 Issues
 Data Access
 Difficult to find through search utility
 Data difficult to find through manual search
 Link required to be sent to minimize effort to locate desired information
 Multiple data systems used by different segments of the program 
resulted in the need for multiple access/passwords
 Data systems were changing during the course of the project
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Lesson-Importance of Engineering Data Systems
 Recommendation(s)
 Assure data systems are developed and available for 
use at the beginning of the project
 Assure data systems are accessible to individuals 
with need to know
 Design data/folder structure to allow efficient location 
and access to data
 Minimize data systems in use across the program
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Lesson-Importance of Early Development of 
Supporting Databases 
 The Constellation Program developed numerous databases to 
be used for Hazard Analysis (HA), Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) and Problem Reporting and Corrective Action 
(PRACA)
 Database development lagged the initiation of the analyses for 
HA and FMEA resulting in “extra” effort to transfer initial offline 
analysis data into the databases
 Databases did not appropriately consider export for document 
development
 PRACA was developed sufficiently early but needed to 
consider how it would interact with existing contractor failure 
reporting systems
 CxPRACA not fully implemented due to program cancellation
 Constellation appeared to address (or attempt to address) most of the 
issues that have limited the value of previous PRACA systems (such as 
inconsistent failure descriptions)
 Would have allowed better use for failure trending data
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Lesson-Importance of Early Development of 
Supporting Databases 
 Recommendation(s)
 Develop databases as early as possible and with 
consideration of data import from existing government 
and contractor systems
 Need to assure databases allow efficient outputs for 
document publishing
 Editable
 Do not “overreach” and mandate database usage for 
activities more efficiently accomplished by other 
means
 Initial efforts defined PRACA as including all 
Material Review Board activities
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Lesson-Importance of Coordination with Safety 
Assessment/Review Panels
 Upper Stage conducted numerous reviews with the 
Constellation Safety and Engineering Review Panel
 This allowed for early identification of potential issues and appropriate 
coordination of responses
 Reviews were well supported by US Element Management, US 
Chief Engineer, and US Engineering in addition to the US 
Safety Team
 CSERP travelled to MSFC which resulted in minimum impact to ongoing 
work allowing design engineering to participate fully
 The CSO for the element under review served as the S&MA 
Technical Authority on the CSERP
 This created a potential for insufficient independence given the CSO 
role in developing and reviewing the analysis prior to the CSERP review
 Software Safety was addressed in much greater detail than 
prior reviews and guidance from the panel was not thorough 
and consistent
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Lesson-Importance of Coordination with Safety 
Assessment/Review Panels
 Recommendation(s)
 Define expectations for hazard analysis content and 
approach, including Software, in program 
methodology documents
 Consider appropriate independence of Safety Review 
Panel (CSO for project/element under review may not 
be appropriate)
 Continue Safety Panel approach of travelling to 
design and development center to allow appropriate 
technical experts from the project to support
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Lesson-Implementation of Software Reliability
 Software Reliability is a relatively new discipline within the 
agency
 SW Reliability was implemented on Upper Stage
 Products developed included Software Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis, Reliability Predictions
 SW Reliability is not yet well established or understood
 Software has long been “disregarded” in Reliability because “software 
doesn’t fail”
 While it is true that software does not fail in the traditional sense, it 
remains a significant source of system failure risk due to many potential 
sources of incorrect software functionality
 “Bad” requirements
 Incorrect coding
 Insufficient testing
 Benefits may include
 Analysis of software design to establish functional criticality
 Definition of minimum testing required to achieve Reliability target
 Reviews Software development processes and products for error 
prevention
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Lesson-Implementation of Software Reliability
 Recommendation(s)
 Develop consistent methodology and implementation 
of software reliability
 Identify minimum content of software reliability 
analysis and support based on software 
classification
 Assure impact of software on system risk is included 
in analyses
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Lesson-Implementation of S&MA Technical 
Authority/Chief S&MA Officer 
 The position of Chief S&MA Officer was recently established as 
the mechanism for  implementing S&MA technical authority
 Position is analogous to a Chief Engineer for S&MA
 Relationship between technical authority of Chief Engineer and 
Chief S&MA Officer is important and must be understood by all 
parties
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Lesson-Implementation of S&MA Technical 
Authority/Chief S&MA Officer 
 Recommendation(s)
 Define and implement the roles and responsibilities of 
the Chief Engineer and CSO in the technical authority 
chain in support of the project
 Note:  implementation of the Medical Technical 
Authority is under development for project support
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Lesson-Importance of S&MA Evaluation of 
Project Risks 
 Risk Management for Constellation was set up to have S&MA 
assess project risks for Safety impact and document the 
assessment in the Constellation Integrated Risk Management 
Application (CxIRMA)
 Element Management/Chief Engineer/Engineering assessed 
most risks as “No Safety impact” based on the presumption that 
we would “not fly like that”
 Based on that approach, risks would never have Safety 
impact
 S&MA assessed many risks as having a safety impact
 By definition, risks with a safety impact were assigned a 
consequence score of 5 because the Ares I vehicle had only 
catastrophic hazards
 After consultation between the Engineering Technical Authority 
and the S&MA Technical Authority, agreement was reached to 
have independent scoring of Safety risk by S&MA and Risk 
Owner
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Lesson-Importance of S&MA Evaluation of 
Project Risks 
 Recommendation(s)
 Assure assessment of risks based on likelihood and 
consequence before any mitigation actions are 
implemented
 S&MA should consider whether an approach to 
Safety risk scoring exists which would allow more 
discrimination between risks 
 By definition, a Safety risk is catastrophic in the 
launch vehicle world (all safety risks were severity 
5)
 Since Safety and Reliability Analyses are “worst 
case”, the consequence does not change. Only 
likelihood is impacted by mitigation
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Lesson-Implementation of Critical Items List and 
Government Mandatory Inspections 
 CIL inspections and Government Mandatory Inspection Points 
are targeted as causes of high operations costs
 Move initiated to eliminate or reduce such inspections to save money
 Constellation Program offered approach by which assessment 
of the probability of failure in the Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis and inspection results in operation would be used to 
justify elimination of inspections
 Assessment of individual failure rates by failure mode is very expensive
 Some disagreement within R&M community of the value of the early 
assessed probability to the decision to eliminate a CIL inspection
 Some value may be gained by assuring a single inspection at 
the latest point in the flow
 This approach may increase cost and/or schedule risk if issues are 
discovered late in the flow
 An approach has been proposed in which government 
inspectors are available for the duration of a process rather 
than stopping the process to await an inspector in order to 
improve efficiency
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Lesson-Implementation of Critical Items List 
Mandatory Inspections 
 Recommendation(s)
 Avoid duplication of CIL inspections
 Inspect at the latest point in the flow where 
characteristic can be inspected
 Requires acceptance of cost and schedule risk 
associated with late discovery of issues
 This is mitigated by contractor inspections
 Provide inspectors dedicated to process where 
government mandatory inspection is required to 
reduce manufacturing and assembly wait/down time
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Lesson-Implementation of Test Article Safety 
Analysis 
 Industrial Safety and System Safety should work together to 
analyze the entire set-up and conduct of test activities
 Industrial safety analysis often treats the test article as a “black 
box” in conducting hazard analysis
 System Safety is normally focused on the safety of flight 
hardware but should support integrated test safety assessment 
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Lesson-Implementation of Test Article Safety 
Analysis 
 Recommendation(s)
 Test safety analysis should assess the integrated test 
set-up, including facility and test article safety
 Assure analysis is done sufficiently early to impact 
hazard control design and implementation
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Lesson-Importance of Procurement Quality 
 Many procurements take the path of least resistance 
and end up bypassing quality
 Credit cards
 Procurement through support contractors
 As a result, hardware sometimes is delivered to 
receiving with no requirements identified for 
acceptance
 “Fixing” issues with receiving inspection of 
procured hardware can be more costly and time-
consuming than up front coordination
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Lesson-Importance of Procurement Quality 
 Recommendation(s)
 All procurements must be coordinated with Quality 
Engineering for assignment of “quality sensitive” 
designation and identification of procurement quality 
and receiving requirements
 Consideration should be given to creating and staffing 
Procurement Quality organization to assure 
consistency in the identification of “quality sensitive” 
hardware and application of quality requirements
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Summary
 Early S&MA involvement is critical to efficient integration of safety, 
reliability and quality into design and development efforts
 Both in-line and assurance must be considered
 Personnel must deployed to provide real time support to design and 
development teams
 Project Management focus must be to create the safest and most 
reliable operational system satisfying allocated technical, cost and 
schedule requirements
 While S&MA does not specifically focus on performance, impacts to 
performance should be identified and understood
 Where “less safe” options are desirable for performance reasons, early 
identification allows risk mitigation to be identified and implemented to make 
the design acceptable from an S&MA perspective 
 Support systems and databases must be available early and 
provide support to the design, development and analysis 
documentation effort rather than being overly burdensome
 In-house systems to support manufacturing and test are needed
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The primary goal of S&MA support to 
design and development  projects 
should be to impact design 
decisions rather than to document 
the impact of design decisions
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Questions
